This paper revisits, with new data, the changes in the distribution of global poverty towards middle-income countries (MICs). In doing so it discusses an implied 'poverty paradox' -the fact that most of the world's extreme poor no longer live in the world's poorest countries.
Contents
.3 Distribution of global poverty ($1.25 and $2) by GNI pc (Atlas) and GDP pc (PPP 2005 constant $) quartiles Table 3 .4 Correlation, GNI pc (Atlas) and GDP pc PPP, average value, 2008-10 Table 3 .5 Estimates of Average GDP pc/day PPP, constant 2005 PPP, constant intl $, pop. unweighted, 1990 PPP, constant vs. 2009 Table 3 .6 LIC threshold as a percent of world per capita GNI 
Introduction
The majority of the world's poor, by income and multi-dimensional poverty measures, live in countries classified by the World Bank as middle-income countries (Alkire et al. 2011; Chandy and Gertz 2011; Glassman et al. 2011; Kanbur and Sumner 2011a, 2011b; Koch 2011; Sumner 2010 Sumner , 2012 . Such patterns matter beyond the thresholds of low-income countries and middle-income countries (LICs/MICs) set by the World Bank, because they reflect a pattern of rising average incomes. Further, although the thresholds do not mean a sudden change in countries when a line is crossed in per capita income, substantially higher levels of average per capita income imply substantially more domestic resources available for poverty reduction, and the international system treats countries differently at higher levels of average per capita income.
1 This paper updates the data for the distribution of global poverty to 2008 in light of the updated World Bank PovcalNet (2012) dataset and new global poverty estimates of Chen and Ravallion (2012) . The paper also discusses factors behind the shift in global poverty towards middle-income countries and how sensitive the distribution of global poverty is to the thresholds for middle-income classification.
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The paper is structured as follows: Section 1 updates the data on the changing distribution of global poverty, 1990 vs. 2008 . Section 2 discusses the factors underlying the changes in the distribution of global poverty and Section 3, the thresholds for low and middle-income countries. Section 4 concludes.
The changing distribution of global poverty
This section updates the global poverty distribution data originally published in Sumner (2010) , and refined in Sumner (2012a) , based on a significantly updated dataset (PovcalNet 2012) ; and extends analysis to the $2 poverty line which is the average (median) poverty line for all developing countries (Chen and Ravallion, 2008) . The data produced is consistent with the new global and regional estimates of Chen and Ravallion (2012) .
It is worth noting at the outset that the author is aware that there are a range of methodological questions about the use of poverty lines per se, and the international poverty lines in particular. These matters are discussed in Appendix. In terms of robustness by data coverage and corroboration: the new PovcalNet (2012) 2008 data covers 84 per cent of the population of LICs and 98 per cent of the population of MICs (see Appendix, Table A2); 3 and the estimates for the distribution of global poverty by income poverty are consistent with the global distribution of multi-dimensional poverty (Alkire et al. 2011) , health-related poverty data (Glassman et al. 2011) and malnutrition (Sumner 2010 ).
1 At a policy level such changes matter because the thresholds are used in various ways by a number of bilateral and multilateral donors in decision-making, often with other indicators to determine the terms of engagement with countries, as well as by various non-aid actors (such as investment ratings agencies). For a detailed discussion of how the thresholds are used by UNICEF, UNDP, UNFPA, WFP and the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, TB and Malaria, see UNICEF (2009: 76-80 Ravallion 2008, 2012) .
The proportion of the world's $1.25 poor in China fell to an estimated 14 per cent in 2008, while India's proportion of world poverty rose to 35 per cent, and sub-Saharan Africa's to 31 per cent (see Table 1 .1 and 2.2). The $2 estimates -as noted, the average poverty line for developing countries -tell a similar story to the $1.25 estimates, with a notably lower contribution to world poverty from sub-Saharan Africa.
Estimates for 2008 also confirm that the world's poor (by both $1.25 and $2 poverty lines) largely live in middle-income countries (MICs). The proportion of the world's $1.25 and $2 poor accounted for by MICs is respectively 74 per cent and 79 per cent. This suggests that using the average poverty line for developing countries means that even more of the world's poor live in MICs. 4 In spite of the global distribution of poverty, it is important of course to note that LICs typically have higher rates of poverty incidence (see Table 1 .1) and a larger poverty gap (see Sumner 2012b). Thus any discussion of poverty in MICs should not distract from poverty in LICs.
That said, some MICs do have surprisingly high poverty headcounts (and a higher than expected poverty gap) even at the higher average level of per capita income found in MICs. Across all MICs, the average (population weighted) incidence of poverty is almost one in five of the population at $1.25/day, and 40 per cent at $2/day. In the lower middle-income countries (LMICs), this rises to 30 per cent and 60 per cent respectively.
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Importantly, the shift from the $1.25 poverty line to the $2 poverty line doubles the poor in MICs from almost 1bn to almost 2bn (meaning there are a billion people under $1.25 in MICs and another billion between $1.25 and $2 in MICs). In contrast, the shift from $1.25 to $2 in LICs raises thet total number of people in poverty less so (from 320m to 490m).
In sum, the distribution of global poverty is thus:  Half of the world's poor live in India and China (mainly in India);  A quarter of the world's poor live in other MICs (primarily populous LMICs such as Pakistan, Nigeria and Indonesia);  A quarter (or less) of the world's poor live in the remaining 35 LICs.
Underlying this pattern is a slightly more surprising one when one considers 'fragile states'. In short, the world's poor are increasingly concentrated in fragile LICs (18.4 per cent of world poverty) and stable MICs (60.4 per cent of world poverty). Only 7 per cent of world poverty (90m poor people) is found in 'traditional' developing countries -meaning low-income and stable (e.g. Tanzania) (see Table 1 .2). 4 There are about 920m extreme ($1.25/day) poor people in MICs or a 'new bottom billion' as referred to in Sumner (2012a) . This is 'new' in the sense it is not the 'bottom billion' originally discussed by Collier (2007) , which was identified as the total population of 58 countries that were 'falling behind and often falling apart' (Collier 2007: 3) . This was based on data from the late 1990s and the turn of the century. Incidentally, the total population of the new expanded OECD (2011) 'unofficial' list of fragile states is a little over one billion people of which 400m are extreme ($1.25) poor and 650m are moderate ($2). 5 For comparison, the LMIC group without India has poverty incidences of 25 per cent and 50 per cent at $1.25 and $2 respectively. Table A1 ). Of those 45 countries 26 are low-income and 18 are (lower) middle-income countries (and one country is not classified).
There are 400m poor ($1.25) people living in those 45 'fragile states', who in total, account for just under a third of world poverty. 45 per cent of the poor in those fragile states are living in countries classified as middle income and 55 per cent in countries classified as low income. And 65 per cent are in sub-Saharan Africa. One issue that is evident is that, taking the OECD (2011) 'non-official' fragile states list, more than two-thirds of the poor in fragile states live in just five countries: Nigeria (100m poor) Bangladesh (76m poor), the DRC (55m poor), Pakistan (35m poor) and Kenya (15.7m poor). Similar patterns are even more pronounced if one uses the higher poverty measure of $2/day (see Table 1 .3). The number of poor in fragile states has risen partially due to the revision of countries in the OECD (2011) list; most notably, the inclusion of populous Bangladesh in the group, which has a high poverty incidence but which wasn't in the 43 countries of the OECD (2010) 'Resource Flows to Fragile States' list. 6 This earlier list was the product of combining three available lists of 'fragile states' at that time (Carlton, Brookings and the World Bank's) thus producing the broadest possible list of 43 fragile states at that time. As noted in Sumner (2010) Chandy and Gertz (2011) estimated the proportion of the world's poor in fragile states at 40 per cent using this list. 8 The new PovcalNet (2012) dataset concurs producing a figure of 38 per cent. However, it is worth noting only 21 per cent of the world's poor are in the 'critical' countries and 11 per cent are in the 'in danger' countries. Thus, the use of the 40-country group produces an estimate of global poverty in 'fragile states' similar to that of the OECD (2011) country list. 6 The following were added: Bangladesh, Burkina Faso, Georgia, Lebanon, Malawi, Palestinian Adm. Areas, Sri Lanka and Uzbekistan and the following were removed: Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, The Gambia, Rwanda, Tonga, West Bank and Gaza. See Appendix, Table A1 for full list of OECD (2011) fragile states. 7 For Carlton and Brookings lists see respectively: www4.carleton.ca/cifp/app/ffs_raniking.php and www.brookings.edu/reports/2008/02_weak_states_index.aspx. 8 The new PovCal (2012) dataset produces the following data: 259m $1.25 poor in the 'critical' group, 119m $1.25 poor in the 'in danger' group, and 69m $1.25 poor in the 'borderline' group (totalling 378m without the 'borderline' group and 447m with the 'borderline group'). In short, 21 per cent of the world's poor live in the 20 'critical' countries, 11 per cent live 'in danger' and a further 6 per cent of the world's poor are in 'borderline' countries (in sum, 38.4 per cent of the world's poor in those 60 countries).
Factors underlying the changes in the distribution of global poverty
The changes in global poverty distribution are a result of several factors. First, almost 30 countries became better off in average per capita terms (by exchange rate conversion), attaining 'middle-income' classification, and thus the number of LICs fell from 63 in 2000 to 35 in 2010 (see Table 2 .1). This could fall to just 16 LICs in 2030 if one applies IMF World Economic Outlook (2012) projections up to 2030 (see Sumner 2012b). Second, the world's poor are surprisingly concentrated: not only do 80 per cent of the world's extreme ($1.25/day) poor live in just ten countries, which accounts for 980m (another 'bottom billion') of the world's poor, but almost 90 per cent of the world's extreme poor live in just 20 countries (see Table 2 .2). Of these 'top 20' poor countries by numbers of poor people, only half of these countries are LICs and the remaining half are MICs, and almost all of these are MICs which have attained MIC status in the past decade.
The 28 'new MICs' ('new' in the sense of 'graduating' over the last decade) account for twothirds of the world's poor when added to China, or half of the world's poor without China. Most notably, there are five large MICs (Pakistan, India, Nigeria, China, and Indonesiahenceforth 'PINCIs') which account for a substantial proportion of the world's poor, and indeed, most of the number who 'moved' from living in LICs to living in MICs (Kanbur and Sumner 2011; Glennie 2011). In short, many of those countries where the world's poor are concentrated are countries that became better off in average per capita income terms and graduated to LMIC status over the past decade.
In those countries becoming richer in average per capita terms and achieving MIC status, although the incidence of poverty (percentage of population poor) generally fell, the absolute numbers of poor people fell less than one might expect. The actual number of poor people ($1.25/day) barely fell (or even rose) in India, Nigeria and Angola. In China, Indonesia, Pakistan, Vietnam and Sudan, $1.25 poverty incidence did fall. However, when one considers $2 poverty, there are only substantial declines in the number of poor people in China and Vietnam, and to a lesser extent Indonesia. (2012) and WDI (2011) . Note: * = The poverty data listed in PovcalNet (2012) for these countries in 2008 appears lower than one might expect suggesting caution (see also discussion in Sumner 2012b) and for rates by national poverty lines see Gentilini and Sumner (2012) .
Clearly, there is much more to investigate here in terms of explanatory factors. There are also some data that one might question. The poverty rates listed in PovcalNet for three countries (Pakistan, Sudan and Ethiopia) in 2008 appears to be lower than one might expect compared to national poverty lines (see for discussion, Gentilini and Sumner 2012) . One would want to look closely at population growth rates in the poorest expenditure groups, and what has happened in the channels whereby economic development could lead to poverty reduction (e.g. wage employment, real wages, self-employment and productivity in selfemployment, and the output elasticity of demand for labour). And in doing so reconnecting poverty analysis to broader processes of economic development (Harriss 2007) . Interestingly, for those new MICs with two data points there are some drastic changes away from agriculture value added as a proportion of GDP. For example, the proportion of agriculture value added as a percent of GDP drastically fell in Ghana, India, Laos, Lesotho, Vietnam and Yemen (see Table 2 .4 and discussion in Sumner 2012b).
At a minimum, the fact that poverty persists at higher levels of average per capita income raises questions about the types of economic growth that lead some countries to reduce the number of people in extreme poverty and other countries not to. Most studies have argued that growth is good for the poor in the general sense that the income of the poor rises onefor-one in line with average income (Dollar and Kraay 2002; Gallup et al. 1999; Roemer and Gugerty 1997) , and the poverty headcount ratio declines significantly with growth (Bruno et al. 1998; Ravallion 1995 Ravallion , 2001 Ravallion and Chen 1997) . While it has been strongly asserted that, on average, growth is matched by proportionate reductions in poverty, some evidence challenges this view; suggesting rather that the incomes of the poorest may increase less than proportionately with growth (Besley and Cord 2007; Grimm et al. 2007) . Importantly, the averages hide large variations across countries and across measures of poverty, both questioning the relevance of the global average and whether growth responds differently to different kinds of (chronic and transient) income poverty. Initial inequality has most commonly been identified as deterministic in the heterogeneity of country experience: a higher level of inequality leads to less poverty reduction at a given level of growth (Deininger and Squire 1998; Hanmer and Naschold 2001; Kraay 2004; Ravallion 1995 Ravallion , 1997 Ravallion , 2001 Ravallion , 2004 Ravallion , 2007 Ravallion and Chen 1997; Son and Kakwani 2003; Stewart 2000) . The heterogeneity of country experience has also been linked to changes in inequality over time, due to geographical differences (urban-rural); the sectoral pattern of growth; the composition of public expenditure; labour markets; social capital endowments and the variance in actual rates of growth (Fields 2001; Kraay 2004; Mosley 2004; Mosley et al. 2004; Ravallion 1995; Ravallion and Chen 1997 PovcalNet (2012) . Note: * = The poverty data listed in PovcalNet (2012) for these countries in 2008 appears lower than one might expect suggesting caution (see also discussion in Sumner 2012b) and for rates by national poverty lines see Gentilini and Sumner (2012) . 
The thresholds for low and middleincome countries
The shift in global poverty raises various questions about the thresholds themselves, and whether any thresholds solely or largely based on defining poverty by 'poor' countries rather than 'poor' people are useful any longer, given the declining number of low-income countries.
The LIC/MIC thresholds are based on GNI per capita average income (exchange rate conversion). 10 One could argue that thresholds set in the 1960s are worthy of a substantial review, particularly because (i) the methodology for original threshold setting has never been published; 11 (ii) some 40-50 years of new data are available since the thresholds were originally established; (iii) there are questions over whether 'international inflation' ought now to include China and other 'emerging economies' in its calculation, and indeed whether the use of 'international inflation' rates for the world's richest countries is an appropriate way to assess the LIC/MIC thresholds over time for the world's poorer countries, which may have had inflation rates above the 'international inflation' rate.
More fundamentally, one could also ask: should such thresholds simply be abandoned outright or a more sophisticated approach considered? Alternatively, such thresholds could instead be applied at a different level, for example, sub-national level (so poorer states in India would qualify; see later discussion on sub-national income per capita).
With regards to assessing if the changing global distribution of poverty is an artefact of methodology (meaning a sleight of hand), there are several issues. First, are the thresholds a meaningful way of dividing the world into four groups of countries, in relative terms at least? Interestingly, and coincidentally, the current thresholds for LIC, LMIC, UMIC and HIC are somewhat similar to the quartile boundaries if one splits the world's countries with the necessary data into four equal groups. For example, the current classification, the threshold for LICs (<$1005 GNI per capita) is reasonably close to the threshold for the bottom quartile (<$1,180); the threshold for LMICs ($1006-$3,975) corresponds with quartile two ($1,181-$3,850); and the threshold for UMICs ($3,976-$12,275) corresponds with quartile three ($3,851-$10,120) (see Table 3 .1).
Analysis of the countries in each quartile (GNP pc Atlas and GDP PPP pc 2005 constant $) in 1990 and 2008/9 and the changing distribution of world poverty by quartiles produces interesting results (see Tables 3.2 and 3. 3). Of course, this is a relative comparison in contrast to an absolute comparison of country thresholds. What is evident is that the vast majority of countries are in exactly the same quartile by GNI pc Atlas and GDP PPP pc in 10 The World Bank's thresholds are discussed in-depth in Sumner (2012a) . See also Nielsen (2011). The World Bank's 'Atlas method' takes GNI in national currency and converts it to US dollars using the three-year average of exchange rates (taking the average of a country's exchange rate for that year and its exchange rates for the two preceding years), adjusted for the difference between national inflation and that of 'international inflation' (the weighted average of inflation in the Euro Zone, Japan, the UK, and the US as measured by the change in the IMF's Special Drawing Rights deflator). 11 According to the short history of the Bank's classifications available on their website (World Bank 2011a), the actual basis for the original thresholds was established by: 'finding a stable relationship between a summary measure of well-being such as poverty incidence and infant mortality on the one hand and economic variables including per capita GNI estimated based on the Bank's Atlas method on the other. Based on such a relationship and the annual availability of Bank's resources, the original per capita income thresholds were established.' The actual documentation containing the original formulae are identifiable by their World Bank document numbers (contained in the Excel sheet on the World Bank's classification history webpage noted above), but these are World Bank board documents and not publically available. The exact formulae of the thresholds have never been published. Indeed, the World Bank's Public Information Centre notes in personal correspondence that: 'there is no official document that we can find that ever specified an exact formula for setting the original income thresholds… When IDA was established in 1960, member countries were classified... based more on a general understanding and agreement by the executive directors of each country rather than strict income guidelines [emphasis added] -though, for the most part, the classifications were in line with per capita income levels'. [Personal correspondence].
1990 and in 2008 with the exception of 17 countries which have risen quartile by GNI pc and 16 countries that have risen quartile by GDP pc PPP. Taking either the GNI pc by Atlas (as per the LIC/MIC estimation) or the GDP PPP per capita, in 1990 almost 90 per cent of the world's poor lived in the poorest quartile of countries. Whilst, in 2008, only a third of the world's poor were in the poorest quartile and two-thirds were in the quartile above (Q2) the poorest quartile.
Four-fifths of the world's poor in Q2 GDP PPP per capita in 2008 were accounted for by India and China. The remainder relate both to countries rising from Q1 to Q2: notably Pakistan and Vietnam and also Bhutan, Cape Verde and Guyana and populous countries already in Q2 such as Indonesia. (2012) There is the question of how sensitive the changes in the distribution of global poverty are to the LIC/MIC thresholds. The two figures (Figures 3.2 and 3. 3) below respectively show the cumulative poverty counts by GNI per capita with LIC/LMIC/UMIC thresholds identified. 44 per cent of the world's poor live in India and Nigeria; countries that are about 20 per cent above the $1005 threshold. The shift in the global distribution of poverty from LICs to MICs is thus, of course, a function of the thresholds themselves; but the bulk of world poverty is well above the current $1005 per capita LIC threshold.
Such an assessment is, however, based on a methodological mismatch -the mismatch between the Atlas (exchange rate conversion) method used to construct the 'poor countries' threshold (meaning the LIC/MIC threshold), and the PPPs method used to construct the 'poor people' threshold (meaning the international poverty lines). Thus to assess more systematically how sensitive estimates of global poverty are to thresholds, one approach that can be taken is to produce cumulative poverty counts for $1.25 poverty and plot against GDP PPP per capita at multiples of the $1.25 poverty line (see Figures 3.3 and 3.4) . Indeed, one way one could think about absolute and relative 'poor' countries is by applying the international poverty line -$1.25/day (or $2/day) -for individuals, and multiples of them, to each country's average income. 13 This might mean that one could say there are:
 'Absolute poor' countries: VLICs (very low-income countries) with an average income of less than $1.25 per capita/day, and MLICs (moderately low-income countries) with an average income of less than $2.50 pc/day;  'Relatively poor' countries: LMICs with an average income of less than $5 pc/day, and
UMICs with an average income of less than $13 pc/day (which would be below the poverty line in the USA; see Ravallion 2009);  'Non-poor' or high-income countries: countries with an average income of more than $13 pc/day (which would be above the poverty line in the USA).
Such an approach is open to the criticism that it simply replaces one set of arbitrary thresholds with another set, albeit a set that logically links definitions of poverty. Alternatively, one might make more use of the classifications of low, (and medium, high and very high) Human Development Countries (see UNDP 2011). These are relative and based on the quartiles of HDI distribution across countries, meaning there will always be a quarter of all countries that are low HDI in any year. There is also the UN category of 'Least Developed Countries' used in Table 1 .1 in this paper, which utilises a sophisticated methodology that combines human assets (including nutrition, child mortality, school enrolment and adult literacy), economic vulnerability (including measures of the instability of agricultural production, population displaced by natural disasters, instability in exports, the share of agriculture in GDP and exports), and proxies for economic 'smallness' (less than 75 million people), 'remoteness' and GNI per capita. However, the graduation criteria make it very difficult to leave the category (see Guillaumont 2010 ) and a third of the 49 LDCs are MICs.
Are the current thresholds comparable with the thresholds in 1990? This is a difficult question to answer. Whether 'international inflation' is a meaningful way to update the thresholds is open to discussion. To assess the comparability fully one would want to assess PPPs, although this too is contentious (see Deaton 2010 Deaton , 2011 Deaton and Heston 2010) . One way of looking at the issue is to compare, over time, changes by country group averages. If one considers various GNI and GDP per capita measures, (see Table 3 .5), one finds that that the 'average' for the LIC and MIC country groups are approximately the same as in 1990 by average GDP pc/day PPP (constant 2005 international $). This comparison is interesting as the countries in each grouping have changed substantially, and yet the group average is (reasonably) comparable (and the degree of dispersion within country groups is not high).
An alternative is to make a relative assessment -relative to world average GNI per capita (see Table 3 .6 below) in order to compare the LIC/MIC thresholds to world per capita GNI. Nielsen (2011: 13) notes, 'the low-income threshold fell from 16 to 11 percent of average world income over this period and the high-income threshold fell from 189 to 140 percent'.
One can consider other indicators but it is not clear how to interpret these, as the LIC group average reflects those countries 'left behind'. For example, comparing 1990 and 2009, the average for the LIC group saw little change in forex reserves but significant increases in aid dependency, primary export concentration and weaker domestic savings; all of which likely reflects the LICs 'left behind' being structurally poorer LICs than those which saw average incomes rise over the period. Conversely, the LMIC group average was significantly better off by forex, and had lower aid dependency and lower primary export concentration. However, within each country grouping, although the variation by per capita income is low, the degree of dispersion within country groups for indicators of aid dependency and export indicators would suggest caution in interpretation of the country group averages for these indicators (see for discussion, Sumner 2012b). Table 3 .7).
14 Further, almost half -46 per cent -of India's poor live in states with significant Naxal-related conflict (proxied by deaths data). One could extend this analysis to look at if the world's poor live in conflict-affected and/or poorly governed states in middle-income countries such as Nigeria and Pakistan for example as argued by Evans and Steven (2012) . However, one might also say 60% of Naxalite-related conflict deaths are in just two states (one low income and one middle income -respectively, Jharkhand and Chhattisgarh) and those two states only account for 7% of poverty in India. And as the government of India (GoI, 2012: 2) Sources: GNI pc by state from www.ceicdata.com based on relative GDP PPP pc: (Province GDP pc / National GDP pc)*(National GNI per capita). Poverty data based on GoI (2012). Deaths from Naxal-related conflict from Ministry of Home Affairs data: http://mha.nic.in/pdfs/nm_pdf1.pdf
Conclusions
This paper has updated the data for the distribution of global poverty to 2008 with the most recently available data and explored the factors behind the shift in global poverty towards middle-income countries. It has also examined how sensitive the distribution of global poverty is to the thresholds for middle-income classification.
The updated data and broader analysis substantiates the changing distribution of global poverty towards MICs (however defined) and suggests an apparent 'poverty paradox' -most of the world's poor do not live in the world's poorest countries.
The changing distribution of global poverty challenges the orthodox view that most of the world's extreme poor live in the world's poorest countries, and that extreme poverty is minimal at higher levels of average per capita income. This shifts how we view global poverty because understandings and definitions of poverty have: (i) tended to underemphasise questions of national inequality, and (ii) tended to present poverty as 'residual' at higher levels of average per capita income rather than a structural outcome of specific patterns of growth and distribution, and their interaction with sub-national/spatial inequalities and horizontal/group inequalities.
One take on the data is that extreme poverty is turning gradually from a question of poor people in absolute poor countries to poor people in relative poor countries or non-poor countries (depending on the definition applied for this). This implies a shift over time from international redistribution (via aid) to national redistribution of some kind; and thus a greater focus on governance and the relationship between the poor and the non-poor, as the latter, in the not-too-distant future, may have the capacity to end the poverty of the former.
What the above points to is that poverty research needs to go beyond studying the 'poor.' This would suggest that, rather than study individual or household deprivations as poverty research has tended to do, much more focus should be placed on socioeconomic groups and inter-and intra-group distribution and social differentiation. This means less focus on studying the 'poor' and greater focus on studying the 'non-poor', meaning not only those groups vulnerable to poverty but the secure middle class and elites, and their social relationships with the 'poor'. This would mean more focus on reconnecting poverty research with the broader processes of economic development, and implies a shift from researching the 'traditional' area of mainstream poverty research (meaning deprivation) to researching something different and far more political: distribution.
Of course, many researchers have been doing this already, but some argue that poverty research in the mainstream has been depoliticised by the 'measurement obsession'. Measurement is not the problem, however. The problem is embedding poverty research within an analysis that includes distribution, social differentiation and the process of economic development -in short, the political economy of poverty. Poverty research has underemphasised questions of inequality under the assumption that poor people always live in poor countries so inequality does not matter if everyone is poor. That is no longer so certain. Mainstream poverty research has also tended to present poverty as 'residual' at higher levels of average per capita income, rather than an outcome of specific patterns of economic development and social structures and relationships. Poverty in middle-income countries raises a question mark over this. 
Appendix: Methodological appendix
The pattern observed in the distribution of global poverty raises numerous methodological questions. First, there are the $1.25 and $2 poverty lines themselves have been subject to considerable contention (for critical review see Fischer 2010) . Most notably, such contention has centred on Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) related issues (see discussion in Sumner 2012 drawn from Deaton 2010 Deaton , 2011 Deaton and Heston 2010; Klasen 2010) . However, in spite of various issues related to data quality (e.g. the treatment of urban and rural areas of large countries); prices for 'comparison resistant items' (e.g. government services, health and education); the effects of the regional structure of the latest International Comparison Programme; the absence of weights within basic headings which may result in basic headings being priced using high-priced, unrepresentative goods that are rarely consumed in some countries; the use of national accounts statistics data that does not reflect consumption patterns of people who are poor by global standards), Deaton (2010: 31) concludes that the reweighting of the PPPs matters less than might be thought and instead, the quality of underlying household surveys and national accounts is a more urgent area for improvement: Given these points, it is important that the distribution of global poverty noted by expenditure poverty holds across other poverty measures (see Alkire et al. 2011) . Further, that the population coverage of the poverty data used is reasonable (see Table A1 below). In fact the population coverage is of such a level that countries with missing data comprise a relatively small proportion of the population of LICs and MICs, and their absence will not make a substantial difference to estimates of the global distribution. For this reason, as per Chandy and Gertz (2011) , estimates here do not 'fill' data gaps like Chen and Ravallion (2008) with weighted regional averages. There is some slight bias in the estimates towards MICs, but the population coverage of LICs is still respectable. 
